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Abstract 
This strategy paper focuses on making the most of the EU single market. The EU should pursue a 
genuine single market, and treat it as a common asset of all its citizens, economic operators and 
member states. The economic case to be made on behalf of the genuine single market is powerful, 
even more so due to the findings of recent empirical economic research. However, only the genuine 
single market can realise the expectations of such large gains. Weak, ‘feasible’ action plans cannot! 
The strategy is based, first of all, on a clear design of the genuine single market and subsequently 
concentrates on ‘what it takes’. Ten types of actions sum up ‘what it takes’: five at the EU level, 
four at the EU-member state interface, and finally, the realisation of legitimacy and acceptance. The 
five types of action at the EU level include cluster strategies (e.g. digital single market; energy 
union); actions for cross-cutting economic activities (e.g. [r]etail and logistics); horizontal 
approaches (e.g. public procurement, especially more credible national enforcement; consumer 
protection); a more detached application of EU better regulation and finally alternative design of 
segments of the single market (e.g. capital markets union and the Unitary Patent). The four types 
of action at the EU-member state interface are based on the premise that member states ought to 
exercise their powers in ways that minimise or avoid negative effects on the single market. The 
actions include the pre-emption of the exercise of national powers hindering the functioning of the 
single market (e.g. major distortions, lowering costs of regulatory heterogeneity), optimal 
centralisation of powers in four EU network industries and in financial markets, member states 
acting as good custodians of single market functioning in their own country and effective 
enforcement and market surveillance. Finally, legitimacy of the single market has been negatively 
affected in a few sectors such as road transport, horticulture, construction and aspects of tourism. 
Legitimacy is of the essence for any single market strategy worthy of the name, implying that more 
firm measures to end adverse developments hitting a small segment of the working population 
must be taken. 
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1. Purpose and thrust of the single market strategy  
This strategy paper is focused entirely on making the most, and nothing less, of the EU single 
market. This has far from having been achieved, however, which in itself is remarkable. The 
single market route, which started early in the 1980s,1 is littered with plans and strategies full 
of acts of cross-border liberalisation, initiatives for EU regulation and modest adaptations of 
EU governance. But the distance between the gradual build-up of the internal market, piece 
by piece and over decades, and the creation of a truly single market, is still quite long.  
Making the most of the single market, and nothing less, is based on the powerful idea that the 
single market is a common asset of all EU citizens and member states. Our asset. Our single 
market. And this potentially valuable, common asset is being badly managed; it is seriously 
underperforming. Making the single market work (function) effectively as intended by its 
intrinsic logic and for its fundamental aim, amounts to joint asset-management by all member 
states and the EU bodies, rewarded by valuable long-term economic and other gains. Each 
time a member state or certain political forces pre-empt a fundamental deepening, they are 
damaging their own asset and, in the process, also negatively affecting the value of the common 
asset for all others in the EU. And if all member states act individually as if each one of them 
can find exceptions or define ‘red lines’ where not justified by single market logic (read: 
distortions or deficits), the single market would be hollowed out or erode quickly. Fortunately, 
free movement is hard EU law, backed up by a European supreme court; otherwise 
unravelling would have happened long ago. All EU countries want the single market, but then 
again they all act like trade negotiators trying to ‘bring something home’ or define defensive 
interests, thereby reducing step-by-step the single market accomplishments or preventing 
those from being realised. Defensive interests against what? Against their own asset? This 
makes no sense, whether from a long-term economic perspective or from a single-market logic. 
All the common-asset holders jointly enhance the value of their shared asset. Of course, this 
asset is a very long-run asset, yielding over time, and not always a ‘quick buck’ tomorrow 
morning.  
The present strategy paper is not, first of all, an economic paper, but rather is focused on the 
overriding aim, called a “genuine single market”, and a strategy to realise it. The economic 
case for such a genuine single market has received a lot of attention recently, also from the 
                                                   
* Jacques Pelkmans is Senior Fellow at CEPS and Professor at the College of Europe. This paper was 
prepared at the request of the Impact Assessment Unit of the Directorate for Impact Assessment and 
European Added Value, within the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services (DG EPRS) 
of the General Secretariat of the European Parliament. 
1 When the European Economic Community (EEC) finally began to think of an internal market instead 
of a mere customs-union-plus, work submitted by the European Commission to the newly created 
Internal Market Council of Ministers in 1982 and 1983 showed a serious lack of knowledge and facts. 
Another wake-up call was the Albert & Ball report (1983) for the European Parliament. These 
‘discoveries’ inaugurated a tradition of regularly returning advocacy of deepening and widening (the 
scope) of the internal market based on long lists of measures.  
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present author.2 The case is powerful. The core problem of any serious single-market strategy 
is to overcome the cleavage between the attractive economic potential of a genuine single 
market and the overwhelming, although ill-considered tendency to search for what is 
politically ‘feasible’. Going for the latter will continue the pursuit of a non-design ‘by the 
piece’, without yielding much of the prospective gains. The economic gains will be used as an 
argument, but such strategies cannot possibly deliver them, and indeed cannot come even 
anywhere near. The aim of the present paper is to address the cleavage, taking the rough 
contours of the economic gains for granted.  
2. A genuine single market forms the foundation of a genuine EMU 
The analogy with the euro and the eurozone is much closer than many realise. In EMU, the 
first (Maastricht) design centralised monetary policy and set up an independent central bank, 
but it did not yet express the notion that EMU would create a collective good (‘club’ good), 
with all the consequences that this implies. Namely, joint management, joint decision-making, 
joint disciplines, all for the quality of one’s own collective good, the euro. As we now realise 
only too well, the entire financial services and capital markets and institutions for financial 
stability were either lacking or severely insufficient; now they are largely centralised and with 
tougher quality criteria. And economic policy coordination as well as reforms have become to 
some degree Europeanised or even eurozone-ised. Under the slogan: this is what a genuine 
EMU requires.  
Is it so different for the single market? We are so accustomed to thinking of the single market 
as the addition of numerous specific measures and regulations/standards that we tend to 
think it is very different in the single market. This is severely mistaken. It would only be 
defensible if one regards the single market as whatever the politics of the moment allows the 
single market to be, with all the shortcomings and distortions as a result. In other words, such 
a single market amounts to what is a politically feasible collection of accomplishments, 
disregarding or denying the single market’s intrinsic functional, regulatory and economic 
logic. If ad-hoc, politically convenient incompleteness and lingering distortions are accepted 
rather than firmly addressed, one acquires anything but a genuine single market. Such a far-
from-single and ill-functioning EU market is very different from the eurozone with a single 
currency: after all, one cannot have two-thirds or half of a single currency and this has major 
implications. In contrast to the politically feasible far-from-single market, the genuine single 
market is a radical, highly productive idea, very similar to what it takes to enjoy the genuine 
EMU. The deeper the single market is in the five component market types,3 and the more 
numerous the overlapping, cross-cutting and horizontal links (see below), the more the 
genuine single market will assume the characteristics of a highly valuable joint asset that every 
member state would want to benefit from as well as protect against erosion, bad management 
or the search for exceptions or opt-outs. When comparing with EMU, why would Europe have 
its current political ambitions of arriving at a genuine EMU (for 19 EU countries) and not very 
similar political ambitions of arriving at a genuine single market (for all 28) in the longer run, 
based on a clear concept, performance-based designs and action plans? Not only that, a 
genuine EMU has to be designed with the (genuine !) single market (as part of the ‘E’). Indeed, 
a genuine single market makes for a more superior EMU too.  
                                                   
2 The main source is the wide-ranging EP’s Costs of Non-Europe project (see further). See also Pelkmans 
(2006), Pelkmans (2011b), Straathof, Linders, Lejour & Moehlmann (2008), Campos, Moretti & Coricelli 
(2014) and Mariniello, Sapir & Terzi (2015).  
3 See section 5 and Figure 1.  
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3. A genuine single market requires an ambitious strategy 
The genuine single market needs a strategic paper drafted by ‘the presidents’ of EU bodies 
(except perhaps the ECB president) just as much as EMU does. And a far more ambitious 
backing in the European Council than it has hitherto received. That is a logical consequence of 
having and better managing ‘our’ single market, our joint asset. And just as – in the case of the 
euro – it took (what were seen by member states as) radical measures such as centralising bank 
supervision and bank resolution (with EU money if bail-in is not enough), the genuine single 
market will require degrees of joint management that, today, may sound as hardly feasible or 
far-fetched. A genuine single market goes to the hard core of European integration: the single 
market was, is and will remain the primary reason of attraction of the EU for members and 
candidates alike. Unlike EMU, it concerns all EU countries (and the EEA-3 countries). 
Moreover, the single market is profoundly wanted by the UK, too, otherwise hesitating 
whether to stay in as EU member. This most explicit UK preference shows the joint asset value 
better than anything else. However, the single market the UK wishes to keep is, today, a very 
incomplete and underperforming single market. It could be so much more attractive for all, 
including the UK. Decisively enhancing this economic attractiveness is what a single market 
strategy should be all about.  
4. Two core questions 
The core questions about the EU single market have always been and remain:  
a) What is the single market actually? 
b) How is it best used, as the major means in the treaties, for the effective pursuit of the EU’s 
leading economic aims?  
When posing the core questions, one finds a striking difference with the debate on the genuine 
EMU, in that the latter has generated numerous papers and reports on what exactly is a 
genuine EMU and hence what it requires, whereas that is hardly or not the case at all for the 
single market.4 Indeed, the single market is not discussed in terms of arriving at a genuine 
single market. But it should be. Only the genuine single market can match the expectations about 
large economic gains that been calculated in many recent reports, not to speak of the qualitative 
but nonetheless important dynamic economic effects. These prospective economic gains of 
some 5-8% of EU GDP, if not higher still, cannot be extracted from weak or politically 
convenient so-called strategies. These gains simply pre-suppose the genuine single market in 
the form of assumptions about what the ideal scenario might be. The EU cannot go on 
underpinning analytically and ever more convincingly that overcoming many and deep 
market integration ‘deficits’ will yield enormous economic gains, and yet not act in earnest. 
That is, only promulgating highly selective, relatively soft and incomplete reviews or mini-
strategies with long lists of small items, without first being clear what the genuine single 
market is and what it takes. Since 2000, the European Council has declared numerous times 
that the internal market should be further improved in various ways. No doubt, something of 
these intentions has been accomplished,5 but there is a severe risk of undermining credibility, 
if not de facto allowing the fundamental priority of the single market to be dismissed or quietly 
shelved time and time again, while acknowledging it on paper.  
                                                   
4 The report by Mario Monti (2010) revived the internal market debate in the EU, but its follow-up in 
the two Single Market Acts was rather modest and selective.  
5 An accessible overview of what has been achieved e.g. in the periods between 1985 and the end of 
1992, as well as between 1993 and 2010, is provided in Pelkmans (2011a).  
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5. What is the single market actually?  
The basic idea of the single market is simple: it consists of the Europeanisation of the five types 
of markets, which together6 serve as the foundation of every modern economy. In other words, 
goods, services and factors of production (labour, capital and knowledge and codified 
technology) should be free, allowing for actual and credible potential mobility across intra-EU 
borders. Since markets are often regulated, in different degrees, and other interventions take 
place at the national (or even regional) level, a single market requires: i) that free movement 
and the right of establishment have to be unrestricted, ii) that EU regulation takes over, where 
appropriate and justified by market failures, or mutual recognition is accepted and iii) that 
other interventions in ‘national ‘ markets either have to be non-distortive or trivial for the EU 
economy, or ought to be combined in some effective way at EU level, whatever is appropriate.  
In the EU, even after nearly six decades of market integration, this basic idea has gradually 
come closer, but it is still quite far away. This is not always understood. The famous 1985 
Commission White Paper “Completing the internal market”,7 setting in motion the EC 1992 
process, has rightly been praised at the time as a courageous strategy, but its flaw was hardly 
ever pointed out: the title. Since the paper did not even offer a definition of what a ‘completed’ 
internal market was, how could it suggest that EC 1992 was all about ‘completing’ it? 
Nowadays, more than two decades after the successful ‘completion’ of EC 1992 – not of the 
internal market! – many citizens and journalists still think the single market was then 
‘completed’8 and was no longer a leading problem after 1992. Since the early 1990s, single 
market policy proposals are perceived as ‘technical maintenance’ or slight modernisation of 
highly specific areas, but rarely as EU issues of prime importance.9 Nor has the EU, ever since 
1993, provided a strategic vision on what the ultimate single market would eventually have to 
be, and why.  
6. Single market, the basics of a modern design 
The single market has an intrinsic logic that is purely functional, not political. This is reflected 
in the basic design. Once the basic design has been realised, a second set of design issues 
follows in order to ensure that the EU makes the most of its immensely valuable common 
asset. The basic design is discussed in the present section, the supplementary design 
requirements will be set out in the remainder of this strategy paper.  
As Nobel Laureate Jan Tinbergen (1945 and 1954) already clarified early on, modern market 
integration necessarily combines what he denoted as ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ integration. It is 
the proper combination of the two that will ultimately allow optimum market integration. 
                                                   
6 The market for land is not included here, as it is of course not mobile. But it matters for the free 
movement of persons and for the right of establishment of companies. Ignoring transition periods, in 
the EU this market is essentially free.  
7 COM (1985) 314 of 14 June 1985, “Completing the internal market”. 
8 In fact, these mistaken perceptions are bolstered by seminars and other activities, carrying titles 
referring to 20 years of the single market (by the European Commission), and the like. Again, all that 
happened at the end of 1992 is the completion of the 1992 programme of more than seven years, a great 
accomplishment to be sure, but nothing like the ‘beginning’ of the single market. For (the many) details, 
see Pelkmans (1994) and Pelkmans & Sutherland (1990). 
9 With the probably exception of the services directive, although most of the tumultuous debate was not 
on the single market virtues of the proposal but about fears of a social nature.  
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‘Negative’ integration refers to the removal of intra-EU border and other barriers that hinder 
or prevent free movement and the full exercise of the right of establishment. This is a necessary 
but insufficient condition for market integration, let alone for the proper functioning of a single 
market. For the latter, also ‘positive’ integration is required, pre-empting or removing 
distortions in that single market by means of e.g. common competition policy and other 
common powers (such as a common trade policy), as well as by solving or overcoming market 
failures no longer at national but at EU level. Positive market integration tends to rely heavily 
on EU regulation (in various ways) and other common policies such as agriculture (given its 
heavy interventionist nature at first) and fisheries, transport policy and (later) environment. 
What exactly is done in common and to what extent is ideally determined by a functional (not 
a political) subsidiarity test.10 As with all markets, the appropriate market institutions will 
have to be common as well, where and insofar as justified.  
The treaty traditionally speaks, first, of the ‘establishment’ of the internal market, which refers 
to the realisation of free movement and the fully-fledged right of establishment, and, second, 
of its ‘proper functioning’.11 This comes close to the Tinbergen approach and has proven to be 
extremely useful in the competent hands of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).  
The fundamentals of the basic single market design are brought together in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1. Fundamentals of single market design 
 
Notes: M.R. = mutual recognition; SHEIC refers to market failures related to Safety, Health, Environment, Investor 
and savers’ protection, and Consumer protection. 
Market integration ‘deficits’ remain if cross-border liberalisation is incomplete due to ‘carve-
outs’ from free movement and the right of establishment, and if EU regulation, mutual 
recognition and common policies remain incomplete to pre-empt distortions and/or fail to 
                                                   
10 See Pelkmans (2005a  and 2005b). 
11 Nowadays in the TFEU, Art. 26/1, the text simply reads “functioning”. The CJEU might therefore be 
somewhat less strict, in theory, but this textual approach still leaves much scope for proper functioning.  
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overcome (all) market failures, and finally when EU institutions cannot exercise all required 
functions or remain incomplete in their remit to ensure proper single market functioning.  
The Costs of Non-Europe project of the EP is inspired by these fundamentals and has 
successfully identified, in a series of in-depth reports, many market integration deficits and 
their approximate costs for the EU (where quantifiable) as well as various qualitative 
drawbacks of these deficits.12 The assembled empirical economic evidence is impressive, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. The compelling inference is that a genuine single market 
would generate enormous economic gains. If it were possible – but that is a very tall order – 
to introduce all these quantified gains in a suitable CGE model, the general equilibrium 
economic effects are likely to be (much) greater still. Never mind the qualitative aspects that 
would also benefit the EU economy.  
The aim of the single market, from the Rome Treaty until today and tomorrow, is to generate 
additional growth beyond what individual member states could achieve, without this deep 
integration and cooperation.13 The potential gains as reflected in the Costs of Non-Europe 
project and the already realised gains are the central motivations for a single market strategy. 
This strategy is logically oriented towards making the most of the EU internal market as a 
common, valuable asset: a genuine single market.  
7. Towards the genuine single market 
The proper functioning of the single market has received increasing attention over time from 
EU decision-makers. Treaty revisions, the rise of EU regulation to jointly overcome market 
failures, the retreat of costly and distortive large-scale interventionism in areas such as 
agriculture and the six modes of transport, the much more liberal EU trade policy, the wider 
scope of EU competition policy and the single-market-promoting role of CJEU case law in 
many areas, including services, IPRs and of course mutual recognition, have all played their 
part. Undoubtedly, the single market today is much deeper and wider in scope as well as 
functioning more effectively than it was 30 or 40 years ago.  
Nevertheless, the Costs of Non-Europe project and many other sources have shown that the 
enormous single market glass is at best half-full. Getting the most out of the single market for 
the EU economy requires a rethink and a preparedness to act as a good joint-asset manager. 
                                                   
12 A summary of the Costs of Non-Europe project and the economic gains simulated or projected is 
found in Zsolt Pataki (2014), “The Costs of Non-Europe in the Single Market, Cecchini revisited: An 
overview of the potential economic gains from further completion of the European Single” 
(http://europarl.europa.eu/RegData/studies/STUD/2014/510981/EPRS_STU(2014)510981_REV1.E
N.pdf); this refers to a series of research reports on the free movement of goods (by Marco Hafner, Enora 
Robin & Stijn Hoorens of RAND Europe ; study no. PE 536 353), on the EU consumer acquis (by Mark 
Peacock of GHK, study PE 536 357), on the Digital Single Market (by Wojciech Paczynski of GHK), on 
the single market for services ( by Jacques Pelkmans, Federica Mustilli & Jacopo Timini of CEPS, study 
PE 536 354), on public procurement and concessions (by Chris Smith and Andrew Lilico of Europe 
Economics, study PE 536 355), and three studies on several modes of transport and tourism 
[summarised in Monika Nogaj (2014), “Single Market in Transport and Tourism”, study PE 510 985, 
October, European Value Added Unit, EPRS, European Parliament]. The easiest search for all these and 
related reports is via www.europarl.eu/thinktank . 
13 See also Campos, Moretti & Coricelli (2014) for a pathbreaking attempt to empirically verify exactly 
this via a control group approach. They find that the EU (mainly the single market in the sense of Figure 
1) on average has enjoyed extra gains of some 12% of GDP. In an ex-post simulation, Straathof et al. 
(2008) find some 10%.  
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With 28 EU countries, of course, this is not easy. But strategy formulation should not be 
affected by whether it might be easy, but rather by the magnitude of the economic gains and 
the proper focus on what to do. Moving towards a genuine single market, which makes the 
most out of the internal market, requires ten types of policy action. The many market 
integration ‘deficits’, as identified in the Costs of Non-Europe project and elsewhere, can all 
be addressed within these ten types of action.  
The ten types of action are listed in Table 1 and elaborated in the remainder of this paper.  
Table 1 first distinguishes two blocks of actions, one for five actions at the EU level and another 
for four actions on the EU/member states interface. In addition, a genuine single market 
requires legitimacy with and acceptance by the European citizenry, political forces and 
workers. Altogether, the ten types of action amount to a formidable agenda and major 
challenges of the Union’s leadership. One inference can already be drawn here: the potential 
gains of the genuine single market are enormous, but what it takes to reap these gains is 
equally enormous, both for EU bodies and for member states! There is no ‘free lunch’.  
Table 1. Types of actions for a genuine single market 
 
 
The corollary is critical, too: it is illusory, if not hollow, but in any event futile, to let the 
communication heralds announce, time and time again, that the single market is taken serious 
by the EU leadership if EU decision-makers are not prepared to undertake the types of actions 
listed in Table 1. No such joint asset can be expected to generate large gains if an endless series 
of restrictions, exceptions, red-lines, collective action problems, resistance to centralisation 
(where justified) and refusals to incorporate ‘our’ single market into domestic politics, are not 
addressed in earnest.  
8  JACQUES PELKMANS 
 
8. EU-level types of actions 
The five types of action at the EU level are all driven by the overriding ambition of getting the 
most out of the single market and in this way serve the socio-economic objectives of the Union. 
Permanently. This is why EU countries are in the EU in the first place, so the paper merely 
elaborates what it takes!  
8.1 The first set of actions concerns cluster strategies or policy linkages. In some sub-markets or 
policy domains, for the single market to become effective and more deeply integrated, intra-
EU barriers cannot effectively be addressed and common intervention cannot be effectively 
pursued if approached in a too-fragmented fashion. In some instances, it is likely to be much 
more effective to set up policy strategies in a cluster or based on a well-coordinated linkage 
with one or more other areas. This sounds abstract until one studies telling and significant 
examples such as the digital single market and the energy union. In the Costs of Non-Europe 
project, one digital single market contribution has studied only three economic activities 
(cloud computing, payments, parcel delivery as a corollary of e-commerce) and it might yield 
between €36 billion and €75 billion in gains.14 However, the digital single market as a whole is 
regarded as a ‘blockbuster’ for economic gains (once said to generate an extra 4% of GDP15) 
with recent research suggesting a possible economic gain of some €415 billion.16  
Its substance is spread over many areas; in other words, it is not just about apples and pears 
but an entire fruit basket.17 It comprises telecoms issues (where the market is fragmented and 
the industry cannot consolidate at EU level, not even when mergers are checked by DG COMP; 
but it is also about roaming, etc.), extended into wider and unnecessarily sensitive spectrum 
questions, new-generation infrastructures, cybersecurity questions (with many aspects), 
removing barriers to intra-EU e-commerce and enjoying wider choice, copyright (including 
geo-blocking, the antithesis of a single market for consumers, but also the remuneration model 
for content creators, yet in turn undermining competitiveness by fragmentation), financial 
services issues (e.g. paying with bankcards and credit cards), contract law, competition policy 
(e.g. the e-commerce Inquiry launched by DG COMP) and consumer redress across intra-EU 
borders. Moreover, it is firmly linked with items 5, 6 and 7 in Table 1, which need to be 
approached much more with a view to the effective working of the (here, digital) single market 
– and that is not the case right now. Moreover, the digital single market also implies the 
transformation of e-markets and e-activities which is taking place. In other words, it is not only 
about integrating existing national markets but also about allowing if not facilitating 
disruptive innovation, the ‘sharing economy’ and new business models, to be exploited 
throughout the Union. This requires easy entry in markets and better access to venture capital, 
a perennial underperformer in Europe. These prospective dynamic gains (which, of course, do 
not solely depend on the single market) cannot be estimated quantitatively, yet they are 
essential for the vitality of the European economy and indeed for visions like European 
Industry 4.0.  
                                                   
14 Paczynski, op. cit.  footnote 12. 
15 CopenhagenEconomics (2010). 
16 See Pataki (2014, in footnote 12). For further work, see the SWD quoted in footnote 17.  
17 See e.g. COM (2015) 192 of 6 May 2015, “A digital single market strategy for Europe”; and the SWD 
on economic analysis and empirical evidence (see SWD, 2015, 100 (same date). For a non-technical but 
enlightening comment, emphasising the dynamics and wider economic context in which these 
proposals ought to be assessed, see Blackman (2015).  
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The ‘energy union’ combines three policy domains, namely energy, climate strategy and 
innovation. The Commission, in its proposal,18 further distinguishes the three well-known 
components of the energy leg: energy security, the fully integrated European energy market, 
and energy efficiency (as a means to moderate demand), but of course these three are closely 
intertwined. Narrowing down the energy union to the single energy market, within the 
‘energy package’, the simulated economic gains might still classify it as a blockbuster, with 
some €70-plus billion. These ‘narrow’ gains are far from easy to acquire, as a single, telling 
quote from the Commission proposal shows: “Today, the EU has energy rules at the EU level, 
but in practice it has 28 national regulatory frameworks. This cannot continue.” Nevertheless, 
difficult as one element might be, the notion of an Energy Union is precisely to go beyond the 
narrow single market set-up, and to approach these domains together. These policy-linkages 
would endow it with true blockbuster properties, with attention to the dynamics in these 
markets or induced by these policies, which unfortunately are exceedingly hard to quantify at 
this stage, if ever.  
These two major examples of a policy-linkage approach are the fruit of an attempt by the 
Juncker Commission to work in teams-of-Commissioners: no less than eight for Digital and 
seven for the Energy Union. In the past, such ‘joint ownership’ of a cluster so crucial for the 
single market was absent. The Commission is therefore to be complimented. Of course, having 
a team does not automatically make it effective, and whether this ‘joint ownership’ is going to 
be matched in the Council and the EP with their splintered Committee structures, remains to 
be seen as well. Both have a great responsibility to think and act strategically, and avoid 
ripping the packages apart, eroding their utility.  
8.2 A second set of actions relates to cross-cutting economic activities or markets.19 Cross-cutting 
market activities cannot easily be classified or addressed in a single area, but – unlike policy 
linkages – they require highly specific and targeted actions in the various areas, with a view 
to facilitate such economic activities. Examples include logistics – an important sector in 
Europe and for globalisation, but hardly recognised as such – and retail. Whereas retail is well 
organised in the EU and several plans have been pursued, a ‘genuine single market’ is not yet 
experienced in this sector. There is a strong link with items 6, 8 and 9 in Table 1. A revealing 
exercise recently undertaken in the Benelux found that, even in this microcosm of the single 
market, mutual retail market access via establishment is de facto, and partly de jure, made 
rather difficult and costly. The European logistics sector runs into more or less similar 
problems and it seems hard to tackle them in earnest. The 2012 EU High Level Group on 
Logistics apparently never really worked well and no final report was published. In both cases, 
and possibly in other such examples, what matters for exploiting commercially the single 
market is the option for European companies to employ their business model throughout the 
Union without any problem.  
8.3 Horizontal approaches consist of related measures to be applied to a single area, which itself is 
horizontal in nature. Typical examples include public procurement and consumer protection. 
Both are half-way houses in the EU. The new 2014 public procurement regime is less 
cumbersome and includes innovations such as ‘competitive dialogue’ between selected 
companies (focused on the quality, best-fit or innovativeness rather than merely a low price) 
                                                   
18 COM (2015) 80 of 25 February 2015, A framework strategy for a resilient Energy Union with a forward-
looking Climate change policy 
19 Note that the Commission employs the term “cross-cutting” on its website for policies such as 
sustainable development, better regulation and strategies to overcome the financial crisis. Our text 
refers to economic activities or markets which “cut across” traditional divides in the internal market.  
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and the ‘partnership’ procedure for new goods that not available on the market. Also the new 
concessions Directive may be seen as an improvement in transparency and bidding ‘for’ the 
market. But member states flatly refuse (so far) to revise, tighten and largely harmonise 
national remedies and institutions under the 2007 Remedies procedure. Ironically, the 
legalistic reasons behind that refusal to improve enforcement and access-to-justice for bidders 
have the effect of continuing a hopelessly divergent, inefficient and ineffective system, which 
de facto has a strong chilling effect on potential bidders from other member states. This 
severely undermines the credibility of protecting new (especially foreign EU) entrants in 
public procurement. Even a simple overview of how public procurement enforcement and 
judicial review inside member states takes place, and how dramatically it differs, demonstrates 
the failure of the last leg of the EU procurement regime.20 
Consumer protection used to be dominated by disparate national measures and procedures. 
It happened that so-called consumer protection actually helped to keep foreign entrants out of 
the local market (e.g. via retail banking and advertising). Recently, a greater Europeanisation 
has been witnessed, as a result in part of the consumer rights Directive. And much EU SHEIC 
regulation, in fact, protects consumers (and workers) on the basis of EU objectives in directives 
or regulations, complemented by European standards. Nevertheless, consumer protection still 
differs considerably across the member states and e.g. product liability – although based on 
strict liability due to a basic EU directive – procedures and outcomes are highly divergent. 
Consumer protection can be one reason why business models in (r)etail are prevented from 
being rolled out over the single market. After decades of experience, one wonders whether 
distinct details in national consumer policies reflect genuine variations in the level of 
protection, which would render harmonisation problematic.21 More often than not, it is merely 
national traditions grown over decades that would have to be modified with harmonisation, 
without really affecting the level of consumer protection.  
8.4 The most general and widely applied EU instrument for the single market is of course EU regulation. 
The Union has embraced a Better Regulation philosophy and agenda for at least the last 
decade, if not longer.22 Although Better Regulation has sound bureaucratic and political 
motives as well, the fundamental argument for Better (EU) Regulation of markets is that 
SHEIC regulation23 should preferably maximise net benefits (where quantifiable). Regulation 
is always about benefits first – it is impermissible, indeed, costly, to regulate when there is no 
market failure; hence there is no benefit in overcoming it. And benefits of EU regulation always 
have to be spelled out first, if necessary with extensive field research or quantification efforts. 
If regulation is justified by benefits, one subsequently has to show that the costs are lower, 
preferably much lower. Even when not quantifiable, (EU) regulation should seek to minimise 
the costs for achieving well-specified objectives. Another fundamental premise is that (EU) 
regulation ought to be efficient and effective in pursuing the objective. Of course, this is 
another way of saying that the costs are minimised for realising a given objective. Without 
Better Regulation, there is a serious risk that the economic gains from deeper market 
                                                   
20 See Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2012, ch. 7) for details. 
21 Since harmonisation in the presence of genuinely distinct preferences may well lead to a lowering of 
welfare for some in the Union.  
22 Already in the Member States’ Declaration 18 of the Maastricht Treaty, the costs and benefits are said 
to be taken into account when writing EU regulation. Impact assessment, a key element of Better 
Regulation, has been formally applied to all Commission initiatives since mid-2003.  
23 The overwhelming majority of EU regulation is about SHEIC objectives, driven by market failures. 
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integration would be eroded or eliminated by non-evidence-based regulation without 
regulatory disciplines, which is always unnecessarily costly.  
EU Impact Assessment has become quite sophisticated, even when further improvements can 
be made. The Better Regulation package is a serious attempt at doing the latter.24 But this is 
only about the Commission’s role. The roles of the Council (where impact assessment is absent 
and the Commission’s results receive too little discussion) and the EP (where timid attempts 
are now being made and it is unclear still how little or much MEPs care) are not always geared 
to Better Regulation disciplines – when the going gets hard, ‘politics’ reigns. Costly and overly 
complex EU regulation may actually emerge from the EU legislature, not necessarily the 
Commission. Another major issue for ‘good’ EU regulation is how to get rid of ‘bad’ 
regulation. Bad regulation is not efficient or effective (or both) in attaining the SHIEC 
objective(s), as long as it is generating high costs. Therefore, it lowers or annuls the net 
economic gains of the single market for all. However, one has to realise that bad regulation at 
one point in time had enough support to pass the EU legislature; in other words, such 
convictions might linger for years.  
The question is whether empirical evidence may sway EU lawmakers to improve on it 
radically enough to generate net benefits. Although the REFIT programme has several 
purposes of a more technical nature, it is possible to ‘read’ in its (somewhat vague) remit that 
ex-post evaluation, fitness tests, etc. should identify unsatisfactory, if not ‘bad’, regulation and 
improve on it or remove it where no solid case for maintaining it can be made. Analytically, 
this seems the proper route, but that it is typically not what happens in the Brussels EU circuit. 
What happens is, first, that consortia of NGOs are founded, e.g. the ‘Better Regulation 
watchdog’ as a network to protect citizens’, workers’ and consumers’ rights.25 The consortia 
then attempt to prevent certain parts of EU regulation to be the subject of scrutiny, thereby 
violating the very principle of evidence-based EU regulation in the first place. They do this not 
so much as an ordinary way of lobbying, but starting from the premise that REFIT is an 
ideological instrument.  
Other networks act similarly with respect to the environment, e.g. attempting to obstruct the 
scrutiny of the Habitat Directive (an extremely problematic piece of EU regulation, and not 
because of its aims!) and the Birds’ Life Directive. Yet another case is the very costly REACH 
(chemicals) Regulation, which pre-empts [since 2007] any initiative to improve the regime 
until at least 2019 if not later, given its procedures about registration and costly testing. Again, 
this is not about the objectives of REACH, which are widely shared in the EU. Preventing new 
EU laws to be ‘bad’ regulation is thus not the only issue of Better Regulation. Getting rid of 
past mistakes by practicing lessons from the EU’s recent experience with Better Regulation 
seems far more difficult, even when the aims of such regulation are not at issue! One confuses 
aims, to which many are attached, with the techniques and instruments of regulating properly. 
This lowers the gains from the single market.  
Another major obstacle to Better Regulation in the EU is the handling, or rather the lack of 
proper handling of the Precautionary Principle (PP). For some in the EU, bringing this up is 
                                                   
24 COM (2015) 215 of 19 May 2015, Better regulation for better results, and a host of accompanying 
documents with background evidence or ancillary proposals. For a detailed and authoritative comment, 
see Renda (2015). 
25 See www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2015-
047_upa_better_regulation_watchdog_founding_statement_and_members.pdf; for an example of how 
the European labour unions look at REFIT (‘threat to the social acquis communautaire’), see Schoemann 
(2015). 
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largely taboo. Calling for the application of the precautionary principle as a basis for EU 
regulation can be justified, but such calls must be very carefully assessed before accepting 
them. One important reason is that PP-based regulation tends to be costly, indeed possibly 
very costly.26 Another reason rarely made explicit is that, once the PP has been accepted as the 
basis for EU regulation, the disciplines of ‘good’ regulatory practices typically weaken, as the 
evidence-base is by definition not available or insufficient. De facto, therefore, with the PP, it 
has turned out to be easier to make more extreme demands or impose extra costs on market 
participants precisely “because one cannot be sure”. Schools of thought have emerged setting 
out what numerous operational consequences a ‘good’ application of the precautionary 
principle must imply, which tend to raise costs even higher.  
There are two ways of approaching this dilemma. One is to attempt to impose legal disciplines 
for the eventual application of PP, with tests. This is made extraordinarily difficult because 
some political forces do not primarily regard the PP as a principle with disciplines, and even 
resist its application being subjected to impact assessment (although the CJEU has insisted on 
this). More often than not, efforts at making the application of PP so difficult are framed as 
tactics originating from business lobbies, rather than detached attempts to arrive at better EU 
regulation. Nevertheless, it would be great progress to ensure that the case for using the PP 
would have to be made on scientific grounds, as much as possible, and not on a-priori political 
preferences. Such decisions should be scrutinised by competent independent outsiders, too.  
The other way is to inspect how EU regulation based on the PP actually works. It is precisely 
where strong a-priori political preferences played a role that EU regulation based on the PP 
has been badly crafted, with unnecessarily high costs, and/or (sometimes) without well-
defined objectives. One of these purely political motives without any rationale is the tendency 
to favour hazards above risks as a basis for regulation: focusing regulation on hazards (rather 
than risks) is unlikely to bring any more SHEIC benefits, but it does hugely augment the costs. 
Of course, proponents do this because it may be very difficult to establish firmly ‘the risks’ in 
certain instances. In preparing regulation, one ought to narrow down which risks are or can 
be known and which cannot, and avoid assuming a wholesale approach only because some 
‘risks’ are not (yet) identified. Ideas such as i) no-data-no-market (as in REACH, irrespective 
of whether or not there is any, even slight, indication of risk for many thousands of substances; 
for the large majority of substances, there are no indications of any risk or the risks are already 
known, hence there is no reason to subject them to heavy and costly testing27); ii) the extreme 
regulatory priority given to renewables in electricity generation (after first having been 
subsidised as well for enormous sums and causing disruption of generation markets in Europe 
and major losses for gas-based generation providers28) and iii) the imposition of protecting the 
habitat of birds and wildlife in Europe without first having a clue (for over a decade after the 
adoption of the Habitat Directive!) where the lines of these habitats would be drawn, what the 
                                                   
26 See e.g. Gollier & Treich (2003) and Majone (2002). 
27 Even if one were to modify REACH by subjecting as many as (say) 5,000 chemical substances to 
testing, where possibly in some evidence or anecdotes a risk might be surmised or suspected, it would 
still mean that some 25,000 substances (of the famous 1981 list of existing substances) could merely 
register without such heavy testing, as no risks whatsoever exist. It is true that in the Classification & 
Labelling Inventory, some 120,000 substances have at least one identified possible hazard. A light and 
proportional approach is to subject substances not known to have any risk nonetheless to a first expert 
judgment based on these reported hazards. That would be a light and rapid procedure clearing many, 
if not most,  substances from further testing.  
28 At the same time that coal, which emits much more CO2, can increase its share in generation! 
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rules would be and what the costs, not to speak of the excessively vague objectives 
representing the benefits, let alone the idea of thinking in terms of alternative policy solutions. 
One can of course frame these critical remarks as ‘political’ but they are not: better regulation 
is functionally in the European interest of all. Once the objectives are set politically, one needs 
to be sure that they are sufficiently precise and operational, and employ ‘Better regulation’ 
methods that are cost-effective.  
8.5 Submarkets of the EU single market need not always be slavishly integrated by pure extension of 
what was first a set of fragmented national markets. In some prominent cases, it might be far better 
to re-design or invent new designs for the relevant segment of the single market. These 
alternative designs should be taken seriously when they significantly enhance the economic 
gains, both static and dynamic, enjoyed from a single EU market. Of course, this does not occur 
every day. But the EU should consciously avoid getting trapped into a common market design 
that is merely the European successor of an outdated or inferior national design. Two 
examples come to mind: the (what is now called) capital markets union and the Unitary Patent.  
The capital markets union boils down to a new design of a European capital market, the basics 
of which already exist via unrestricted free movement (and no exchange controls since 1988), 
EU regulation, an EU agency (ECMA), some standards for clearing/settlement/custody in 
stock exchanges as well as common securities market arrangements (e.g. in cooperation with 
the ECB). However, the EU capital market is a modernised EU framework of what already 
existed at the national level. Nevertheless, the internal market for financial funds does not 
function properly. A deep, very liquid market for funds at European level is a strong 
advantage if properly regulated (where there is a need) and tightly supervised (idem). What 
has become clear is that the European tradition of bank-based funding dominating everything 
else has serious drawbacks. The crisis was so deep because banks were/are so central (and 
overbanking has pro-cyclical effects) and no substantial alternative funding streams such as 
equity were available [and they would not dry up during a banking crisis, as shown by the US 
experience]. With equity capital employed more systematically, the first advantage is that 
there are two channels for monetary transmission, not just one. A second advantage is the 
availability of more and a variation of funds: in the EU, sources for long-run capital are of 
course available but the incentive structure is weak (if not, at times, adverse, as in the case of 
tax treatment of debt vs. equity) and a capital markets union could alter this [e.g. the 
Commission is analysing long-run investment funds, ELTIFs].  
There are other advantages to creating a capital markets union in the sense of setting up or 
strengthening equity alternatives to bank funding.29 There are sensitivities (e.g. securitisation 
has a bad-image problem, but the ECB has carefully analysed exactly what the issues are /were 
in securitisation, and found that simple, transparent securitisation is blameless and has great 
advantages) and, in any event, this type of ‘union’ is all about the long run, requiring profound 
changes in tax and bankruptcy laws, if not others. What matters here is that this new design 
adds value to the potential of the single market to better serve treaty objectives.  
The same is true for the fifth ‘freedom’ in the EU, not specifically mentioned in the treaty, that 
of ‘knowledge’ in the wide sense. Knowledge, codified in a protected format, or tacit, should 
flow as freely as possible in the Union. It is a critical factor of production and of innovation, 
hence, ultimately also of competition and competitiveness inside and outside Europe. This, 
too, relates to knowledge workers as well as to knowledge networks and their financing, which 
                                                   
29 See e.g. Veron & Wolf (2015); Anderson et al., (2015); and COM (2015) 63, Green Paper on Building a 
Capital Markets Union, February. 
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are very often national without much of a view on the European aspects or even shielding 
local ones. The (too?) slow Europeanisation of knowledge creation and related aspects is a 
concern. In this economic activity, there is actually no old design of a single market but a lack 
of design, only slowly tackled by the academic community and business.  
The neglect of this ‘fifth freedom’ is most pertinent in the Rome Treaty’s article on ‘ownership’. 
Art. 345, TFEU, unchanged from Rome, declares matters of ownership to be a question of the 
member states. This is a drafting flaw and the costs for the EU have been very high indeed. 
The original idea was that this would refer to land and state-owned enterprises, but it was 
hijacked by patent lawyers and kept on fragmenting the single market by blocking (or 
hindering, at least) free movement in patented goods, by practising highly effective price 
discrimination and greatly dis-incentivising patenting in the EU.  
The Unitary Patent (UP) is, in the same way as the capital markets union, a re-arrangement or 
reform or an acceptance of centralisation [call it what you will] that is going to change, indeed 
greatly improve, the role of the single market for innovation. And it will do this probably far 
better and more effectively than many subsidy programmes, with their red tape [to keep the 
Court of Auditors at bay], uncertain outcomes and dubious verification of ‘additionality’. The 
UP is fundamentally a single market instrument, for the first time.30 In economics, it is long 
known that market size is a very powerful incentive to innovate and subsequently also to 
patent. So, at the very least, there is a positive ‘double whammy’ prompted by the UP, after a 
lag of a few years: i) the price of patenting has been drastically cut and becomes interesting for 
many SMEs, and no less for MNCs [think of 80-85% price decrease, or even more]; and ii) one 
obtains automatically one patent, identical also in enforcement (a huge problem before) for at 
least 25 EU countries at once, and probably all 28 soon. All this amounts to a regime change, 
if not a different ‘design’, and should be expected, other things equal, to provide a lasting boost 
to invention and innovation in the single market.  
9. Actions on the EU / member states’ interface 
The proper functioning of the single market hinges to a significant extent on the appropriate 
multi-level governance for the sake of getting the most from the single market. In other words, 
the good functioning of the single market cannot only be arranged or guaranteed in or from 
Brussels. The member states are crucial for the genuine single market also after they have 
passed EU legislation in the Council, and, to some extent, even quite apart from implementation 
and enforcement of EU law. Sadly, this is rarely appreciated. It is perhaps possible to provide 
detailed advice on how some critical issues ought to be dealt with at the EU-member state 
interface; indeed, we shall indicate some such aspects briefly. However, such advice is futile if 
member states’ actions are not driven by the firm conviction in each and every member state 
that the single market is a joint asset and that each member state (and not only the ‘other ones’ 
or Brussels) has to exercise sound and pro-active ownership of the relevant issues in the 
interface so as to maintain, if not enhance, the value of the joint asset. Not pro-actively 
exercising ‘ownership’ – perhaps for the sake of short-term gains or the avoidance of 
adjustment or merely due to disinterest – has a cost in damaging one’s own joint asset! There 
                                                   
30 However, due to the clumsy formulation in the treaty, the UP amounts to what is called “a bundle of 
nationally enforceable patents” which is equally enforceable in the entire group of 25 member states. 
The incredible inefficiency is exemplified by e.g. Spain filing a series of CJEU cases, all dismissed (as 
recently as 5 May 2015). And this after more than 50 years of haggling (the first attempt by the 
Commission was in 1962).  
WHAT STRATEGY FOR A GENUINE SINGLE MARKET? | 15 
are four types of actions that need to be addressed effectively for the purpose of a ‘genuine 
single market’ (see Table 1). 
Before doing so, a fundamental issue has to be brought up: the importance of recognising that 
the division of powers between member states and the EU level is and remains a rather 
sensitive question, only discussed in earnest when drafting a treaty revision. That is how it 
should be. This is central to all federations as well.  
 However, safeguarding the existing division of powers, in particular, powers that have to do 
with the single market (mainly, regulation and occasional subsidies), does not say much about 
whether and how member state conduct (may) affect(s) the proper functioning of the single 
market. In between treaty revisions, the relevant question is: Do member states exercise their 
powers in such a way as to minimise or avoid negative effects on the single market? This is not a legal 
question, but an economic and a policy matter. At the moment, explicitly posing this question 
is sensitive, but is not this sensitivity misplaced? Because the single market is a joint asset of 
the member states, it follows directly that applying national powers ought not to affect that 
joint asset negatively. Unfortunately, the treaty is less than clear about it. One can argue that 
Art. 120, TFEU [Member States shall conduct their economic policies with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as defined in Art. 3 TEU..], Art. 
121/1, TFEU [Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common 
concern.] and Art. 121/4 [Where it is established ….that the economic policies of a Member 
State… risk jeopardising the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union…, the 
relevant procedures can lead to a recommendation] lay a solid basis for the EU to begin to 
ensure that member states cannot exercise their powers retained under the treaty so as to 
‘jeopardise’ the proper functioning of the single market, the hard core of the economic union.31 
In any event, the proper functioning of the single market would be greatly helped if member 
states would develop mechanisms, possibly in cooperation and/or with the EU level as well, 
ensuring that the design and effects of national measures under their powers would be tested 
on avoiding or minimising any (negative) impact on the single market. Ideally, this should be 
done by member states themselves (acting as a guardian of the joint asset) but of course all of 
them, all of them in the same way and with full transparency. In actual practice, it might be 
necessary e.g. for credibility, that in some cases this is better assigned to the EU level, for 
example with state aid. The four types of actions will now be discussed briefly with the above 
considerations in mind.  
9.1 The first type of action relates to instances where and when member states exercising powers might 
hinder the functioning of the single market. We shall discuss two categories of issues: first, where 
member states generate distortions that lower the gains from the single market and which 
should ideally be corrected; second, where member states exercise their powers in a non-
controversial fashion, but where non-trivial costs for single market participants nevertheless 
                                                   
31 So far, it would seem that Arts 120-121 have not been applied to the single market directly. However, 
this is curious, to say the least. For present purposes, the two key words in the treaty quotations above 
are ‘objectives of the Union’ and ‘economic union’. Art. 3/3, TEU establishes an internal market, no 
issue there. The Maastricht Treaty gives no definition of the ‘economic union’ (see Pelkmans, 1991); nor 
does the TFEU give a clue. But the economic literature leaves no doubt that the single market is the hard 
core of an economic union. The term is also employed in Canada, where the basic idea is much the same 
(Pelkmans & Vanheukelen, 1988). A careful inspection of what the genuine EMU should consist of 
strongly suggests that the E of EMU comprises three components: single market, economic policy 
coordination and budgetary discipline.  
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arise. One could suggest that the former is an integration ‘deficit’, whereas the latter calls for 
effective inter-member state cooperation in order to minimise those costs.  
9.2 One set of issues emerging from national regulatory policy-making is concerned with distortions in 
the single market. Most state aid that actually or potentially distorts competition in the single 
market is, by now, effectively addressed by the EU state aid regime – a huge improvement 
over (say) 25 years ago. But the few exceptions turn out to matter a great deal. Probably the 
most prominent one is the enormous discretion given member states to subsidise renewables. 
Not only have entire new (e.g. wind) industries been built on these national (!) subsidies 
precisely by EU countries having insisted strongly on a strict stance against (distortive) EU 
industrial policy in the treaties.32 At the same time, the formidable distortions, caused by the 
favourable treatment of renewables in national electricity generation markets, have forced 
huge losses on owners of perfectly efficient low-emission gas turbines. It has prompted 
mothballing of new state-of-the-art turbines and closures of others; worse, some EU countries 
now run into serious capacity problems (especially for winters) and face the risk of black-
outs.33 
Another less acute but seriously distortive behaviour of member states is reflected in the 
highly disparate national track access charges [TACs] for freight trains. Rail freight is by its 
very nature and cost structure a European business – national rail freight only pays off in larger 
EU countries but even then its potential is limited. Indeed, developing European rail freight 
in earnest is another blockbuster gain of the single market,34 but the numerous obstacles and 
distortions are discouraging. The large disparities in TACs are mainly caused by the great 
differences between member states in the recovery rates for (the very high) infrastructure costs 
of rail transport, including passenger services. For passenger rail this is hardly a problem as 
very little cross-border traffic is demanded (and some of that is on fast-rail networks). But the 
single freight market is severely underdeveloped, despite its great potential to improve 
European competitiveness in a range of industrial sectors and its potential to shift freight from 
road haulage (with high external costs) to ‘green’ rail. With common TACs for freight or at 
least TACs all based on similar recovery rates, a major distortion would be out of the way. A 
third highly distortive practice by (some) member states consists of the extreme manipulation 
of the application of the corporate tax base, often on an individual basis. As early as 1992, the 
Ruding report35 was very critical of these distortions. The main problem with corporate tax 
competition is not in the rates, despite all the publicity, but in the endless variations in playing 
with elements of the tax base, the subsequent complexities of transfer pricing and other 
consequences. If a low common rate were agreed,36 levied on a common tax base (as the US 
has for both federal and state corporate tax), tax competition on the rates would probably be 
healthy, transparent and barely or non-distortive. Drawing red lines around national tax 
power, untouchable for the EU, is acceptable, but it cannot be an excuse for maintaining major 
                                                   
32 Art. 173/3, TFEU on ‘industry’ reads: “this… shall not provide a basis for the introduction by the 
Union of any measure which could lead to a distortion of competition.” 
33 Auverlot et al. (2014), Joskow (2011) and ECOFYS (2014).  
34 See Steer, Davies, Gleave (2014), “Costs of Non-Europe in the Single Market in Transport: Road 
transport and railways”, European Parliament, EAVA, June. Based on (limited) current plans and the 
nine freight rail corridors, the expected gains amount to €50 billion. With adequate (and much needed) 
reforms and the required infrastructure investments, the gains grow to some €500 billion.  
35 Ruding et al. (1992). 
36 If 12.5% would be agreed as a minimum rate, almost no changes would be needed in national tax 
laws.  
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distortions in the single market and a wasteful contest between national tax exemptions for 
larger investors.  
9.3 Although the exercise of national powers is usually innocuous in the EU, it may entail considerable 
drawbacks for economic agents trying to exploit the potential of the single market. Such drawbacks 
are particularly cost-raising for traders, production companies and consortia – sometimes for 
value-chains – trying to do business on a truly European basis or compete on the basis of a 
single business model. The problems might also pre-empt or severely discourage the initiation 
of a European business strategy. The drawbacks can be summed up as, first and foremost, the 
costs of the cumul, i.e. the total costs of all (cumulated) regulations a firm is subject to, 
determined by local, regional, national and EU regulations and, second, the costs of regulatory 
heterogeneity. Thus, the assertion that the EU is overregulated is, to an unknown extent, 
attributable to layers of regulation other than the EU level itself.37 To the present author’s 
knowledge, virtually no empirical research has been undertaken, other than in case studies. 
Also, the EU or the collection of member states has no mechanism whatsoever with which to 
consider or address this problem.  
Another problem often mentioned is regulatory heterogeneity: rules and red tape differ between 
many or all member states, despite the existence of EU regulation and numerous European 
technical standards.38 There is a suspicion that regulatory heterogeneity is more costly for 
services than for goods but so far, this remains a conjecture. Again, there is no EU or inter- 
member state mechanism to address the costs of regulatory heterogeneity. At fairly high levels 
of aggregation of product markets, empirical economic analysis suggests that the objections of 
business in Europe would seem to be justified: the costs of regulatory heterogeneity are high 
and its reduction can yield major economic gains39 via a better exploitation of the single market 
potential. The economic problem of regulatory heterogeneity at the individual firm level 
consists of the repetitive fixed costs of entering one national market after another, which 
hinders companies from achieving minimum scale in many national markets.  
De facto, regulatory heterogeneity therefore acts as an entry barrier that will be lower the lower 
the degree of heterogeneity is. However, for member states, there is nothing peculiar about all 
this and they are of course right. All they do is to regulate the way their parliaments want. But 
many of these national rules and procedures have little or nothing to do with genuinely 
diverse preferences between member states. Only some are truly based on diverse preferences 
and subsidiarity suggests that this autonomy is precious and ought to be protected. In 
numerous other instances, voluntary cooperation between EU administrations about mutual 
acceptance of forms or common multi-lingual formats should be very helpful. Mutual 
recognition beyond what the EU is doing can be useful, too. Member states could organise 
themselves in what US states call (voluntarily concluded but binding) ‘compacts’ between 
willing states, here EU countries.40 The idea is that member states act in the spirit of making 
the most of ‘their’ single market and its practical functioning, without any need to involve the 
                                                   
37 This is not to say that the EU is overregulated. It is not even clear what ‘overregulated’ means, let 
alone that one can measure it properly and subsequently compare objectively.  
38 Indeed, Fournier (2015) shows empirically that regulatory heterogeneity inside the EU is smaller than 
amongst OECD countries.  
39 Kox & Lejour (2006), Nordas & Kox (2009) and Fournier (2015). 
40 US states have concluded over 1200 compacts on an incredible variety of regulatory and 
administrative aspects. These compacts do not, as a rule, include all States, although their membership 
often grows over time. 
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EU level. Member states might be interested in organising this more systematically, with 
consumers and business being given a voice as well.  
9.4 On the EU-member state interface, one encounters regular frictions about the appropriate degree of 
centralisation for the purpose of a better functioning of the single market. Any notion of centralisation 
as a remedy for solving specific single-market issues or the better functioning of certain 
submarkets ought to be subject to a serious subsidiarity test. For the sake of the proper 
functioning of the single market, however, the subsidiarity test must be functional, that is, 
analytically based on the criteria in the treaty (scale and cross-border spill-overs) and 
effectiveness, not political. But this is not happening. The centralisation issue is only critical in 
a few markets, mainly those of network industries with very large sunk costs, and financial 
markets. But these are exactly among the blockbusters in the Cost of Non-Europe exercise!  
There are four network industries characterised by large sunk costs: (freight) rail,41 gas, 
electricity and telecoms/digital. These are typical markets where all OECD countries and 
many others have independent regulatory agencies, ensuring better functioning markets. Not 
so for the EU. It is not surprising that these four ‘single’ markets do not function well and also 
remain fragmented,42 given the absence of independent EU agencies. Nor can it be surprising 
that these four markets are amongst the blockbuster gains of a genuine single market. The full 
recognition of this flaw in designing these EU network markets is still absent, although a slow 
recognition of the added-value of cooperative networks of national agencies has emerged (e.g. 
BEREC; ACER; network of rail agencies). The problem is partly one of ‘sequencing’: by first 
establishing national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in these network markets, based on EU 
regulation, but without the overriding obligation to serve the EU single market, and national 
market functioning within this EU framework, member states have created a natural resistance 
and vested interests against justified and proportionate centralisation.  
Moreover, the Commission is of two minds as well, because it risks losing influence if not 
power when such EU independent agencies would be established. Until recently, the 
Commission and member states have been hiding behind the Meroni doctrine, which would 
prohibit such independent agencies at EU level, as the delegation of powers to the EU level 
(i.e. the Commission) could only be re-delegated further to such agencies when explicitly 
allowed in the treaty. However, the logic of Meroni has melted away under the Lisbon Treaty 
and recent CJEU case-law.43 What remains is a political resistance to centralisation by member 
states (and their NRAs) which requires great caution when addressing such resistance step by 
step. In the meantime, the single market in these network industries employs second-best 
approaches to accomplish better functioning, but even those are not to much avail. This 
centralisation taboo has to end and the blockbuster gains should be reaped. This is not to 
suggest that the integration deficits in these four network markets are solely due to the lack of 
an independent EU regulator, but without the latter, one should not expect to arrive at effective 
market integration.  
A more or less similar state of denial by national regulators/supervisors has long lingered for 
banking, insurance and capital markets. A properly functioning single financial market 
                                                   
41 As noted, passenger rail across intra-EU border is marginal, and an increasing share of it is offered on 
high-speed networks. As far as the latter is concerned, market conduct is shaped by intermodal 
competition. Infrastructure and standards are harmonised.  
42 For detailed empirical evidence, see Pelkmans & Renda (2011), Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), European 
Commission (2013) and Pelkmans et al. (2014) for the European Parliament.  
43 For elaboration, see Simoncini & Pelkmans (2014) and the recent literature quoted therein. 
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requires common supervisors with joint rules, including what is called fiscal capacity (to 
conduct bank resolution with full credibility). It took a severe financial crisis, in part caused or 
worsened by the lack of a common and credible regulatory and supervisory regime in the 
single market, before three EU agencies were finally set up. Resistance is so strong that 
member states still have a disproportionate role in the working of these agencies, causing 
slowness and inefficiencies. Only the eurozone and selected member states on a voluntary 
basis have gone the extra mile with centralised quality supervision of (large) banks. Indeed, 
the banking union has been agreed to as well, but the third leg (a common deposit insurance 
system) may not come about for years. If a very costly financial crisis can just barely convince 
EU member states to accept centralisation, one must fear that a functional subsidiarity test for 
the single market will often be avoided. Yet, this damages the joint asset, and hence, one’s own 
single market.  
There is also the obverse of the above reasoning on the functioning of the single market: Are 
member states good custodians of single market functioning inside their own countries? This 
query goes beyond the treaty role of member states with respect to implementation and 
enforcement and is also not concerned with regulatory heterogeneity. Member states have 
retained residual or full powers in many areas the use of which, often inadvertently, may affect 
or make more difficult the conduct of cross-border exchange in the single market. This might 
take the form of infringing EU law which, if discovered or reported, will be remedied by the 
several stages of infringement procedures.  
But this is not what is meant here. Much national or regional legislation, including technical 
implementation or administrative execution, is drafted without having the single market in 
mind. Since all member states do this all the time, it may make the practical execution of many 
small business decisions in the wider single market more difficult, without there being a 
deeper rationale. This is done inadvertently. There is empirical evidence for one set of 
regulatory actions of member states, falling under the 98/34 Committee overseeing 
notifications. The Committee and its procedures are concerned with national technical 
regulations and decrees on goods in areas not harmonised by the EU. This relates to roughly 
20-25% of traded goods in the EU; the rest is either harmonised or unregulated. The idea is 
that mutual recognition should apply, or, at least that equivalence clauses, and European 
standards where available, are incorporated in national law.  
What emerges from the wealth of data and reports published over more than 25 years44 is an 
astounding mass of national regulation, year after year,45 and a stubborn propensity to ignore 
or take lightly some of the basics of the single market. The latter propensity has decreased 
somewhat over time. But this watchdog and correction mechanism has proven that it is 
indispensable for a proper functioning of a segment of the internal goods market characterised 
by only relatively light (national) regulation. There is no other such mechanism in other 
markets. I do not suggest establishing one. Rather, also here, it would be far superior to let all 
member states set up a domestic mechanism to test national draft legislation with respect to 
not just the legality but also their practical effects on the functioning of the single market in its 
own economy. This is best done in the framework of national impact assessment, which should 
include a ‘single market test’, with explicit consultation of business and other stakeholders. 
Solid impact assessment, so far practised seriously in only half a dozen EU countries, is in the 
enlightened self-interest of all EU countries. And to incorporate a single market test would be 
                                                   
44 See the data and references in Pelkmans, Vos & di Mauro (2000) and in Correia de Brito & Pelkmans 
(2012). 
45 In this limited area, the annual number of national laws/decrees amounts to around 700.  
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helpful for member states to assume responsibility for their own role as custodian of the single 
market, with respect to their own laws. Consultation on the single market test ought to be 
possible in English, besides the national language.  
Finally, on the EU-member state interface, the issues of implementation of EU laws, their effective 
and credible enforcement and, for some areas, market surveillance have long featured on the EU 
agenda and much progress has been made in the last few decades. What has not changed are 
the frequent calls for ‘better’ implementation and enforcement by member states being made 
all the time. The 2007 Single Market Review proposed that the Commission would form an 
implementation ‘partnership’ with the member states so as to enhance ownership and thereby 
raise its effectiveness, increase the speed and lower the costs. By mid-2012, this seemed to have 
paid off to some extent.46 One remarkable score is the record-low percentage of non-
implemented directives in the Single Market Scoreboard since 2013.  
But the anecdotes about understaffed SOLVIT centres, the major problems and delays with 
large EU legislative packages,47 the number of second CJEU rulings of non-compliance with 
daily fines for member states, the uncertainties about some aspects of the services Directive 
2006/123, the endless foot-dragging on the European air traffic control system, etc. continue 
to weaken the trust in whether member states are good and willing implementers of what they 
vote for in Council. That member states behave differently in Brussels than at home is 
unacceptable. For decades it has been lamented that national civil servants who negotiate EU 
directives sometimes abandon the area and move to other duties, as such behaviour instantly 
lowers the human capital needed for complex implementation issues. But on the other hand, 
there is also good news. The drastic shift from (single market-related) directives to EU 
regulations since around 2000, has clearly been supported by member states, which in and of 
itself constitutes a significant contribution to reducing implementation issues.  
On enforcement by member states – their duty under the treaty and critical for the confidence 
of business and consumers when seeking to exploit the single market – less systematic 
knowledge is available (as far as the present author is aware). When EU directives are 
implemented, they become national law and enforcement becomes a linear function of the 
general effort to enforce laws properly in the country. These efforts differ between member 
states. Therefore, it may seem a bit hollow to call for better enforcement in countries that 
exhibit a lower inclination to enforce their own laws. There might also be issues with the 
national legal system: if that is regarded as inefficient and slow, such efforts are discouraged 
in the first place. The reliance on ‘mutual recognition’ should now be enforced much better 
with the 2008 Mutual Recognition (procedural) regulation but doubts are reported regularly. 
Here, member states ought to be disciplined in a matter of days, if only to enhance the trust in 
the business world that mutual recognition can be the basis for their strategies in the single 
market.  
However, there is one area where enforcement assumes a special form: market surveillance, 
e.g. in the case of several New Approach directives and for products subject to type-approval 
(e.g. cars and motorcycles). Since the 2008 New Legislative Framework, market surveillance 
has come under stricter obligations for member states (e.g. sufficient resources [which nobody 
in the market believes]; closer cooperation inside national administrations and with the 
customs – with incessant complaints that the latter surveillance is far too lax). A good 
                                                   
46 For the empirical evidence, see Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2012), chapters 5–8.  
47 Such as the first rail package, the second and third gas and electricity packages and a few other 
instances, leading to massive infringement cases before the CJEU. 
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development is the closer inter-member state cooperation among market surveillance 
authorities, which are all in the common business of making the single market function 
properly on this aspect. On the whole, however, European business is not convinced that 
market surveillance works well. Orgalime (machinery and electrical/electronic equipment) 
claims that distortions, via illegal imports (even via the internet) that escape market 
surveillance, are increasing steadily but hard evidence is scarce.  
10. Legitimacy and acceptance 
The single market has gone through cyclical fluctuations in terms of support or resistance from 
the European population, or segments of it. In 1958, support in France for the brand-new EEC 
was so strong that Finance Minister Rueff could introduce a sweeping monetary reform 
combined with the removal of export subsidies, tariff surcharges and the gradual dismantling 
of ‘indicative planning’. But only nine years later, Le Défi Américain48 generated renewed 
interventionist policies for industry, now seen as ‘national champions’. During the second oil 
crisis, EU countries took no interest in the common market and demonstrated little 
preparedness to deepen it. On the initiative of Commissioner Narjes, the German presidency 
began with a new Internal Market Council in November 1982, followed by an alarming Albert 
& Ball report49 to the EP in June 1983, introducing the notion of the ‘costs of Non-Europe’. Only 
five years later, in 1988, the first sensational cross-border mergers – notably, the intended 
purchase of Société Générale by Suez – and the well-publicised popular version of the Cecchini 
report – prompted a short-lived ‘europhoria’ about the single market.  
But for decades, the internal agro market could only be accomplished by means of heavy 
common subsidies and distortions, and high tariff walls, facilitating secular adjustment 
processes to efficient modern farming, at huge costs to society. Judging by the propensity to 
demonstrate and protest, however, it never seemed to be to the satisfaction of the farmers. 
With the two Eastern enlargements, the single market became the subject of profound 
ambiguity: popular as an opportunity for workers and business established in or attracted to 
the new member states, and a rising concern for some specific (especially low-skilled) 
segments of the workforce in other parts of the Union. The referendum in France on the draft 
European Constitution in 2005 was, rightly or wrongly, all about the lack of legitimacy of the 
single services market, symbolised by the Polish Plumber and a false presentation of the 
essence of the proposed services Directive.50 Nowadays, the (un)popularity of the single 
market has come to be mixed up with the very negative fall-out of the eurozone crisis, 
payments to the Greeks (who first cheated, a deadly sin in this respect), the rise of Eurosceptic 
parties and the overall rise of immigrants and asylum-seekers.  
The single market as it stands today has to be made acceptable to large majorities of the 
European population. This cannot be accomplished by ‘communication’. It requires forms of 
political debate and representative structures through which voters recognise the main 
                                                   
48 The American Challenge published by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in 1967. 
49 Albert &  Ball (1983). 
50 Interestingly, the NO in the Dutch referendum was not at all related to the framing of the draft services 
directive and hardly with posted workers. It was suggested that the Netherlands would be ‘sold out’ 
and one opposition party scored well with a poster showing Europe, with the Netherlands cut out! In 
the Netherlands, political research later showed convincingly that much was due to the incapability of 
the political leaders to explain in simple terms the rationale and the essence of the treaty to the people. 
Hence, it was dubbed an elitist project without legitimacy. In the same year, the Eurobarometer showed 
that the Dutch people still supported the EU relatively strongly!  
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features of what is at stake and observe, time and time again, that such debates reflect the 
issues they are deeply concerned about. That is what legitimacy is all about. No single market 
strategy is feasible without this fundamental prerequisite. The genuine single market must be 
a legitimate one, acceptable to large majorities.  
The literature typically speaks about “input legitimacy” (representation of concerns of voters 
in debates and as an input to decision-making) and “output legitimacy” (voters’ satisfaction 
based on results of policy-making). To simplify, the EU has traditionally leaned far more on 
output legitimacy than on input legitimacy. Therefore, a host of proposals to improve on the 
latter has been made51 and these may well be useful. It is unlikely, however, that they will be 
sufficient because they do not address the root of the problem. 
Today’s legitimacy problem of the EU is inextricably linked with two key issues affecting the 
grassroots: first, the negative impact of forms52 of worker mobility across intra-EU borders on 
wages and jobs of specific segments of the workforce, and in some specific sectors; second, the 
lasting negative fall-out of the crisis and the harsh eurozone budgetary approach framed as a 
rescue of bankers at the expense of workers or voters/taxpayers more generally. Both generate 
a strong sentiment that the single market (and the eurozone, to some extent) systematically 
decreases incomes and job prospects for certain segments in society and/or lead to the erosion 
of the welfare state, which these workers crucially rely on. Of course, such sentiments became 
more powerful during the (Great) recession, but they will linger when the economy is in an 
upswing, if nothing is done about it.  
At times, there are additional fears that globalisation (and some parties take the view that the 
‘open’ EU single market is a mere manifestation of globalisation) systematically disadvantages 
low-skilled workers, an inference for which the empirical economic literature provides some 
support. Eurosceptic parties thrive more easily in this climate and resistance by labour unions 
hardens in the process. The strong increase of euro-sceptical parties in the EP can be attributed 
to several other reasons, but the single market, basically supported even by British 
conservatives or UKIP (albeit under certain conditions), should serve as a reason to stay in, 
not to exit or seek selective exemptions. The underlying problem ought to be addressed more 
seriously. One might recognise elements of plain protectionism in the reactions of some parties 
or labour unions, but this is not a sensible solution. Before rejecting this tendency in a 
Pavlovian reaction, it is good for political legitimacy to recognise as well that a structural 
adverse shift in income distribution – affecting certain low-skilled groups of workers and 
causing fears among other groups – is being experienced at the same time.  
                                                   
51 This is not the place to elaborate these proposals. I merely list some: a single face of the euro area 
(might also help the single market); a single presidency of the EU (i.e. Council and Commission); greater 
proportionality of seats in the EP (i.e. less imbalanced for larger member states); greater role of national 
parliaments; more frequent debates in national parliaments with European Commissioners responsible 
for aspects of the single market. 
52 The official route of intra-EU migration is based on host-country control, that is, on respecting local 
(minimum) wages and other labour entitlements. The problem is that this route is massively avoided or 
circumvented and the alternatives have not been properly addressed by the EU single market regime. 
It took many years before the posted workers Directive has been accompanied by an enforcement 
Directive and even that is full of compromises. Thus, for instance, highly artificial legal constructions 
are now practiced in road haulage and in construction (and its value-chain), leading to massive 
displacement of Western workers and/or drastic wage cuts, if not exploitation of Eastern EU workers. 
There is some lingering illegal migration and work, too, which calls for more firm enforcement by 
member states. 
WHAT STRATEGY FOR A GENUINE SINGLE MARKET? | 23 
In sectors such as horticulture, construction, road haulage and possibly in tourism, this 
adverse shift might be a consequence (in part) of a recent single market with high-wage and 
low-wage countries, free labour mobility and a selective failure of applying host-country 
control. Of course, what seems a threat for a worker used to high wages is an opportunity for 
a mobile worker from a low-wage EU country. Therefore, a decent compromise is to allow 
significant opportunities for workers from low-wage EU countries whilst being far more 
ruthless [both at EU level and nationally] on circumventive constructions and fraud, if only to 
demonstrate firmly to low-skilled workers from high-wage EU countries that the law that 
should protect their rights is not an inconsequential piece of paper. In the longer run, now that 
the crisis is over, the gradual convergence of per capita incomes engendered by market 
integration should reduce these problems.  
The strategy to build a genuine single market as described above is ambitious and will be 
sensitive in some respects. It risks being framed in simplistic and sloganesque terms by some 
parties and movements. Such framing will not resonate with most voters if, but only if, the 
project is seen as legitimate. Legitimacy is of the essence for any single market strategy worthy 
of the name.  
11. Conclusions 
There is a cleavage between the appreciable prospective economic gains of a genuine single 
market and the incapacity, shown so far by the EU, to “do all it takes” to realise the genuine 
single market. Any serious single-market strategy must convincingly address the question of 
how to overcome this cleavage. It is misleading and self-defeating to refer to the more recent 
economic studies showing much higher possible gains than hitherto understood, whilst 
advancing mere incremental single-market packages that do far too little to come anywhere 
near these possible gains. The single-market strategy proposed in the present paper outlines a 
package of ten types of actions, policy initiatives and modified attitudes that will enable the 
realisation of the genuine single market. The strategy proposed is not an action agenda with 
lists of well-defined initiatives (although I do discuss many policy aspects in passing). Rather, 
an action agenda for the present Commission and European Parliament period should be a 
next step, after first considering the terms of the strategy proposed here. No action agenda will 
yield much when the ten elements of the strategy to realise a genuine single market are not 
first thought through, debated and adopted in one way or another based on ownership. Many 
of these elements are demanding for both the EU level and for member states. This should not 
be surprising: the genuine single market is an ambitious aim; hence, “what it takes” (and what, 
so far, has turned out to be difficult) cannot be anything but demanding! 
The proposed strategy is first of all based on a clear and unambiguous design of the genuine 
single market, that is, its establishment and its proper functioning. Only once both are pursued 
in earnest and not merely on the basis of political convenience or feasibility, will the greatest 
economic gains, emerging from recent literature, be approximated. If both are not pursued in 
earnest but the single market continues to suffer from many deficits and distortions, it is 
misleading to hold out the prospect of large economic gains before the European voters.  
“What it takes” to arrive at the genuine single market consists of three groups of actions or 
aspects. First, five types of demanding and at times intrusive actions at the EU level. The five 
include i) policy proposals addressing policy linkages or clusters (e.g. energy union; digital 
single market); ii) cross-cutting economic activities (e.g. logistics and [r]etail); iii) horizontal 
approaches (e.g. public procurement and its problematic national enforcement systems; 
consumer protection); iv) better EU regulation (based on ‘benefits first’, solid and detached 
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impact assessment, appropriate disciplines of the application of the Precautionary Principle - 
where less a-priori and a more analytical approach are required – risking otherwise to reduce 
the gains from market integration, without enjoying additional benefits), and v) finally 
alternative designs of submarkets of the EU single markets (e.g. the capital markets union and 
the Unitary Patent, with significant long-run consequences).  
Second, a number of important improvements are needed on the EU-member state interface. 
Before listing the four types of actions or modified attitudes proposed, a more fundamental 
question ought to be posed, if one takes the genuine single market seriously. It is related to the 
division of powers between the EU and the member-state level. That division is sensitive and 
it should be. It is central to a well-accepted Union embracing diversity. However, once market 
and even macroeconomic integration is ‘deep’ and based on a wide scope of EU economic 
freedoms and regulatory powers, it occasionally happens that the line between the effects of 
EU and member state measures can be blurred. The EU level has to make sure that member 
states’ competences, or, more broadly, their policy autonomy – as indicated in and protected 
by the Treaty – remain intact. But shouldn’t that be true for member states as well? In other 
words, do member states exercise their powers in such a way as to minimise or avoid negative 
effects on the single market? It is suggested that (the proper functioning of) the single market, 
as the hard core of ‘economic union’, should not be ‘jeopardised (Art. 121/4, TFEU) by national 
economic policies. This is best verified systematically in sound and detached national impact 
assessment on the basis of a single-market test, which should be performed by all member 
states. The single market is not only dependent on Brussels, also from what member states do 
and fail to do.  
The four types of actions at member states level include firstly instances in which member 
states’ actions hinder the functioning of the single market for economic operators or consumers 
(e.g. via major distortions such as the enormous subsidies of renewables, the highly disparate 
rail access charges for European freight rail or wasteful rivalry in national exceptions to the 
corporate tax base, unlike in the US ; or, innocuously, via cumulation of regulation at three or 
four levels of government, and/or due to regulatory heterogeneity – between member states 
– which turns out to be very costly for firms operating with EU-wide strategies and acting as 
a barrier for SMEs eager to Europeanise). Secondly, on this interface there are frictions about 
the appropriate degree of centralisation for the purpose of a better functioning of the single 
market. This is found in four network markets with large sunk costs (rail freight, electricity, 
gas, telecoms/digital) and in financial markets. It should be noted that precisely these are 
amongst the blockbuster gains of a genuine single market. Thirdly, are member states good 
custodians of the single market functioning inside their own country? Also, here a single 
market test in national impact assessment and ex-post evaluation is a solution, with ample 
consultation options for business in Europe. Fourthly, implementation, credible enforcement 
and market surveillance are critical duties of member states.  
Finally, legitimacy and acceptance of the genuine single market is discussed at some length. 
In recent years, the fact of having an internal market with both high- and low-wage countries 
have generated adverse effects for low-skilled workers in a few sectors, whilst offering 
opportunities (but not always in legally correct ways) for low-skilled workers from low-wage 
EU countries. This sharp contrast concentrated in three or four sectors is hard to justify and, 
in any event, is bound to undermine the legitimacy of the single market, which is of the essence 
for any single-market strategy worthy of the name. These adverse developments – and 
certainly some dubious practices as well as circumvention of the posted workers Directive, 
and the notion of an ‘independent’ – must be urgently and convincingly addressed.  
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